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A R B I T R A T I O N
Does the FAA Preempt California’s 
Authority to Determine the Validity of a 
Performer’s Personal Management Contract?
by Jay E. Grenig
In this case, the Supreme
Court is asked to 
determine whether the
Federal Arbitration Act
preempts the California
Labor Commissioner’s
jurisdiction to conduct an
administrative hearing
and determine whether
an individual has violated
the California Talent
Agencies Act.
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Professor Grenig is author of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
3d edition. He can be reached at
jgrenig@earthlink.net or 
(262) 646-3324.
PRESTON V. FERRER
DOCKET NO. 06-1463
ARGUMENT DATE:
JANUARY 14, 2008
FROM: SUPREME COURT
OF CALIFORNIA
ISSUE
Does the Federal Arbitration Act
preempt the California Supreme
Court’s decision holding that the
California Talent Agencies Act pre-
cluded a manager from requiring a
performer to arbitrate a dispute
with a performer with respect to the
performer’s personal management
contract? 
FACTS
Respondent Alex Ferrer is a former
Florida judge who is the star of
Judge Alex, a syndicated television
program, in which Ferrer arbitrates
minor civil disputes as a form of
entertainment. Petitioner Arnold M.
Preston is an attorney who provides
services as a personal manager,
advising and counseling artistic per-
sonnel in the motion picture and
television industry. He has never
been a licensed talent agent.
In March 2002, Preston and Ferrer
entered into a written management
agreement providing for payment of
a fee based on Ferrer’s earnings
from Judge Alex. According to
Ferrer, the management agreement
was shown to Ferrer hours before a
meeting between Ferrer and several
television network executives and
producers. The agreement also enti-
tled Preston to a sizable commission
stemming from any employment
Ferrer obtained as a result of the
meeting. Although Ferrer did not
obtain employment as a result of
the meeting, he was later employed
in the television industry working
with two of the producers he had
met at the meeting.
The management agreement includ-
ed a standard American Arbitration
Association (AAA) provision calling
for arbitration of disputes. The arbi-
tration clause specifically provided
that disputes about the “validity”
and “legality” of the contract would
be decided by arbitration. Ferrer
resides in Florida and tapes the
Judge Alex television program in
Texas. Preston had his office in
California. Ferrer was in Nevada
when he signed the management
agreement. 
When Judge Alex went on the air,
Ferrer allegedly refused to pay
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Preston the management fee provid-
ed by the management agreement.
On June 4, 2005, Preston filed a
demand for arbitration with the
AAA in Los Angeles, California.
Ferrer responded on July 5, 2005,
by filing an action with the
California Labor Commissioner,
challenging the legality of the entire
management contract under the
California Talent Agencies Act.
Among other things, Ferrer asked
for a declaration that the manage-
ment agreement was void, and for
an order staying the arbitration.
Under the Talent Agencies Act, any-
one who procures or attempts to
procure employment for an artist in
the television, stage, or motion pic-
ture industry is a “talent agency”
and must be licensed by the
California labor commissioner.
Ferrer claims that Preston is not a
licensed talent agent and, moreover,
that the contract Preston presented
to Ferrer had not been approved by
the labor commissioner as required
by the Talent Agencies Act.
The labor commissioner’s hearing
officer determined that the Ferrer
petition asserted a “colorable basis
for exercise of the Labor
Commissioner’s jurisdiction.”
However, the hearing officer also
determined she lacked the authority
to stay the arbitration.
The arbitrator set a hearing on the
merits for January 26, 2006. On
November 2, 2005, Ferrer filed suit
in the Los Angeles Superior Court,
seeking an injunction against the
arbitration. Preston responded by
filing a Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the Superior Court.
On December 7, 2005, the Superior
Court denied Preston’s Motion to
Compel Arbitration, issued the
injunction against the arbitration,
and ordered that the legality of the
entire contract under the Talent
Agencies Act be decided by the
labor commissioner, not the arbitra-
tor. The Superior Court determined
that under the Talent Agencies Act,
the labor commissioner could pro-
ceed with the commissioner’s
inquiry before the parties litigate or
arbitrate their dispute.
In a 2-1 decision, the California
Court of Appeal affirmed the
Superior Court’s decision. Ferrer v.
Preston, 145 Cal.App.4th 440
(2006). Relying on California Labor
Code § 1700.44(a), the court held
the labor commissioner had exclu-
sive jurisdiction to hear disputes
under the Talent Agencies Act.
Acknowledging that the parties’ con-
tract included a standard AAA arbi-
tration clause, including a stipula-
tion that the parties are to arbitrate
any attack on the “validity or 
legality” of the contract, the court
said that California Labor Code 
§ 1700.44(a) nonetheless vests
exclusive original jurisdiction in the
labor commissioner to resolve issues
arising under the act.
The dissenting opinion contended
that the Federal Arbitration Act and
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), 
preempted the majority decision,
stating:
Because it is undisputed (correct-
ly) that the contract before us is
governed by the FAA … it follows
necessarily that the arbitrator
and not the court must deter-
mine the gateway issues. My 
colleagues’ contrary conclusion
—based on the fact that the
Buckeye court did not consider
whether the issue should go 
first to a state administrative
agency—ignores Buckeye’s hold-
ing that its rules trump conflict-
ing state procedures.
The majority of the Court of Appeal
did not dispute the applicability of
the Federal Arbitration Act, but dis-
tinguished Buckeye on the grounds
that the Talent Agencies Act vests
initial jurisdiction in an administra-
tive agency, whereas Buckeye
involved an attempt to avoid arbi-
tration by filing a lawsuit in a court. 
The California Supreme Court
denied review on February 14,
2007. Preston’s request for review
by the U.S. Supreme Court was
granted on September 25, 2007. 128
S.Ct. 31 (2007).
CASE ANALYSIS
Arbitration is a method of dispute
resolution in which the parties sub-
mit a dispute to an impartial person
selected by the parties. The arbitra-
tion procedure is generally less for-
mal than a judicial trial. The arbi-
trator’s decision is final and binding
on the parties.
Traditionally, courts refused to
enforce agreements to arbitrate. 
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
(FAA) changed that common-law
rule and made a written agreement
to arbitrate specifically enforceable
in the federal courts—if the agree-
ment is connected with a maritime
transaction or evidences a transac-
tion involving foreign or interstate
commerce. According to the
Supreme Court, in enacting the
FAA, Congress intended to create a
new body of federal substantive law
affecting the validity and interpreta-
tion of arbitration agreements and
to exercise as much of its constitu-
tional power under the Commerce
Clause as it could in order to make
the FAA as widely effective as possi-
ble. See Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The
FAA applies in state courts as well
as in federal courts.
The Supreme Court has determined
that in enacting the FAA, Congress
declared a national policy favoring
arbitration and withdrawing the
(Continued on Page 182)
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power of the states to require a judi-
cial forum for the resolution of
claims that the contracting parties
have agreed to resolve by arbitra-
tion. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687
(1996). According to the Supreme
Court, there is a strong federal poli-
cy favoring arbitration of statutory
claims. Green Tree Financial Corp.-
Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79,
89-90 (2000).
The Supreme Court has held that a
court’s duty to enforce an arbitra-
tion agreement is not diminished
when a party bound by an agree-
ment raises a claim based on statu-
tory rights. Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991). By agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, the Supreme Court
reasoned, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their res-
olution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.
Preston asserts that, under the FAA,
the arbitrator decides issues con-
cerning the legality of the entire
contract. He argues that, because
only attacks on the arbitration
agreement itself are decided by the
judiciary, allegations that the entire
contract is void or illegal are decid-
ed by the arbitrator. According to
Preston, state law abrogation of the
right to arbitrate is subject to FAA
preemption. Preston reasons that,
on its face, Ferrer’s petition to the
labor commissioner is nothing more
than a private, civil pleading that
seeks an adjudication that the
entire contract is invalid. 
Ferrer responds that the FAA does
not preempt state procedural laws
that the parties expressly incorpo-
rate into their contracts. It is
Ferrer’s position that the principal
purpose of the FAA is to enforce the
parties’ contract in accordance with
its terms. Ferrer argues that, if the
arbitration clause is valid and
applicable, the parties may proceed
to arbitration if either is dissatisfied
with the commissioner’s determina-
tion. If so, Ferrer says an arbitrator,
rather than a court, will resolve the
controversy.
It is Preston’s position that the fact
that Ferrer was the petitioner in the
labor commissioner proceeding and
a plaintiff in the Superior Court
action distinguishes this case from
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.,
534 U.S. 279 (2002), in which the
court held that an agreement
between an employer and an
employee to arbitrate employment-
related disputes does not bar the
EEOC from pursuing victim-specific
judicial relief, such as back pay,
reinstatement, and damages, in an
Americans with Disabilities Act
enforcement action.
In Waffle House, Preston notes, the
EEOC filed an enforcement action
in its own name. According to
Preston, the decision in Waffle
House clearly turned on the identity
of the EEOC as the named plaintiff
and its status as a nonsignatory to
the arbitration agreement. Preston
submits that Waffle House ultimate-
ly hinges on the exercise of discre-
tion by the administrative enforce-
ment agency. Preston asserts that in
his case, by contrast, the labor com-
missioner did not file an action in
her own name. Based on Ferrer’s
pleading, the hearing officer merely
found there was a “colorable” case
based on Ferrer’s pleadings. There
was never any evaluation of evi-
dence, much less any decision by
the labor commissioner to file a law-
suit in her own name.
Ferrer disagrees, asserting that the
FAA does not preempt the
California procedural rules that
merely postpone arbitration. Ferrer
suggests that, because the labor
commissioner’s review is informal,
expeditious, and subject to com-
plete de novo review, Ferrer says it
does not tie the hands of the arbi-
trator, who is left, as between the
parties, to fashion the ultimate rem-
edy. At the same time, as between
the parties and the state of
California, Ferrer contends the
Talent Agencies Act procedure per-
mits the commissioner to exercise
her administrative, regulatory
authority to conduct an investiga-
tion, make an initial determination
whether the act has been violated,
and take appropriate administrative
action—an authority that private
parties are powerless to negate by
contract.
Preston contends the express intent
of the parties in the present case
was that the arbitrator shall decide
the validity of the entire contract.
Preston points out that the manage-
ment agreement expressly states
that the “validity or legality” of the
contract is subject to arbitration.
Even if the “validity or legality” lan-
guage was not present, Preston
argues that the management agree-
ment incorporates the AAA rules. It
notes those rules contain an express
agreement to arbitrate issues of the
“validity” of the contract.
Pointing out that California has long
been recognized as “the center of
the entertainment industry,” Ferrer
asserts that the state has a strong
interest in regulating relations
between artists and those who pro-
cure or attempt to procure employ-
ment for them. Ferrer claims that
employing the expert office of the
California labor commissioner to
monitor and adjust relations
between agents and artists furthers
important state interests.
Preston concludes that, if Ferrer
had honored his promise to arbi-
trate, including the specific promise
to arbitrate the “validity or legality”
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of the contract, this case would
have been expeditiously and eco-
nomically resolved at a two-day
hearing on January 26 and 27,
2006. Instead, Preston says the mat-
ter has been contested before the
arbitrator, the labor commissioner,
the Los Angeles Superior Court, the
California Court of Appeal, the
California Supreme Court, and now
before the highest Court in the land.
Noting that the management agree-
ment specifically provides that it is
governed by the laws of California,
Ferrer contends that Preston agreed
to be bound by the Talent Agencies
Act procedure. Accordingly, Ferrer
says that Preston should be bound
by that agreement.
Ferrer also suggests the Supreme
Court should consider overruling its
decision in Southland v. Keating,
45 U.S. 1 (1984), and hold that the
FAA does not preempt state statutes
exempting certain state law contro-
versies from arbitration.
This proceeding implicates four
Supreme Court decisions: (1)
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); (2)
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534
U.S. 279 (2002); (3) Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991); and (4) Southland
v. Keating, 45 U.S. 1 (1984).
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, borrowers brought a
class-action lawsuit against Buckeye
Check Cashing, alleging Buckeye
had made illegal usurious loans dis-
guised as check cashing transac-
tions in violation of various state
statutes. For each deferred-payment
transaction the borrowers entered
into with Buckeye, they signed an
agreement containing provisions
that required binding arbitration to
resolve disputes arising out of the
agreement. The borrowers sued in
Florida state court, alleging Buckeye
charged usurious interest rates and
that the agreement violated various
Florida laws, making it criminal on
its face.
The trial court denied Buckeye’s
motion to compel arbitration, hold-
ing that a court rather than an arbi-
trator should resolve a claim that a
contract is illegal and void from the
beginning. A state appellate court
reversed, but was in turn reversed
by the Florida Supreme Court,
which reasoned that enforcing an
arbitration agreement in a contract
challenged as unlawful would violate
state public policy and contract law.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the Florida Supreme Court, holding
that, regardless of whether it is
brought in federal or state court, a
challenge to the validity of a con-
tract as a whole, and not specifically
to the arbitration clause within it,
must go to the arbitrator, not the
court. The Court explained that, as
a matter of substantive federal arbi-
tration law, an arbitration provision
is severable from the remainder of
the contract. Unless the challenge is
to the arbitration clause itself, the
Court said the issue of the con-
tract’s validity is considered by the
arbitrator in the first instance.
Finally, the Court held that this
arbitration law applies in state as
well as in federal courts.
The Court rejected the borrowers’
claim that the agreement as a whole
(including its arbitration provision)
was rendered invalid by the usuri-
ous finance charge. Because the
borrowers challenged the entire
agreement, and not specifically its
arbitration provisions, the Court
ruled the arbitration provisions
were enforceable apart from the
remainder of the contract, and that
the challenge should be considered
by an arbitrator, not a court. 
In the Waffle House case, Waffle
House employees had to sign an
agreement requiring employment
disputes to be settled by arbitration.
After an employee suffered a seizure
and was fired by Waffle House, he
filed a timely discrimination charge
with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission alleging his
discharge violated Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The
EEOC filed an enforcement suit, to
which the employee was not a party,
alleging the employment practices of
Waffle House, including the employ-
ee’s discharge “because of his disabil-
ity,” violated the ADA, and that the
violation was intentional and done
with malice or reckless indifference.
The complaint requested injunctive
relief to eradicate the effects of
Waffle House’s past and present
unlawful employment practices.
Waffle House petitioned under the
FAA to stay the EEOC’s suit and to
compel arbitration, or to dismiss the
action. The district court denied
relief. The Fourth Circuit concluded
that the arbitration agreement
between Baker and Waffle House did
not foreclose the enforcement
action because the EEOC was not a
party to the contract, but had inde-
pendent statutory authority to bring
suit in any federal district court
where venue was proper.
Nevertheless, the court held that
the EEOC was limited to injunctive
relief and precluded from seeking
victim-specific relief because the
FAA policy favoring enforcement of
private arbitration agreements out-
weighs the EEOC’s right to proceed
in federal court when it seeks pri-
marily to vindicate private, rather
than public, interests.
The Supreme Court held an agree-
ment between an employer and an
employee to arbitrate employment-
related disputes does not bar the
EEOC from pursuing victim-specific
judicial relief, such as back pay,
reinstatement, and damages, in an
ADA enforcement action. The Court
reasoned that neither statutes nor
183
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the Court’s decisions suggest that
the existence of an arbitration
agreement between private parties
materially changes the EEOC’s
statutory function or the remedies
otherwise available. Despite the FAA
policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments, the Court said nothing in the
FAA authorizes a court to compel
arbitration of any issues, or by any
parties, that are not already covered
in the agreement. The Court said
the FAA does not mention enforce-
ment by public agencies; it ensures
the enforceability of private agree-
ments to arbitrate, but otherwise
does not purport to place any
restriction on a nonparty’s choice of
a judicial forum.
Because the EEOC was not a party
to the contract and had not agreed
to arbitrate its claims, Court ruled
the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy
goals do not require the EEOC to
relinquish its statutory authority to
pursue victim-specific relief, regard-
less of the forum that the employer
and employee have chosen to
resolve their disputes. Although an
employee’s conduct may effectively
limit the relief the EEOC can obtain
in court if, for example, the employ-
ee fails to mitigate damages or
accepts a monetary settlement, the
Court noted that the Waffle House
employee had not sought arbitra-
tion, and there was no indication he
had entered into settlement negotia-
tions with Waffle House.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991),
Gilmer was required by
Interstate/Johnson, his employer, to
register as a securities representa-
tive with, among others, the New
York Stock Exchange. His registra-
tion application contained an agree-
ment to arbitrate when required to
by NYSE rules. NYSE Rule 347 pro-
vides for arbitration of any contro-
versy arising out of a registered rep-
resentative’s employment or termi-
nation of employment.
Interstate/Johnson terminated
Gilmer’s employment at age 62.
Gilmer filed a charge with the
EEOC and brought suit in the dis-
trict court, alleging that he had been
discharged in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
Interstate/Johnson moved to compel
arbitration, relying on the agree-
ment in Gilmer’s registration appli-
cation and the FAA. The court
denied the motion, based on
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974), which held that
an employee’s suit under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not
foreclosed by the prior submission
of his claim to arbitration under the
terms of a collective-bargaining
agreement. The court of appeals
reversed.
The Supreme Court held that an
ADEA claim can be subjected to
compulsory arbitration. Since nei-
ther the text nor the legislative his-
tory of the ADEA explicitly pre-
cludes arbitration, Gilmer was
bound by his agreement to arbitrate
unless he could show an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the
ADEA’s underlying purposes. The
Court determined there was no
inconsistency between the impor-
tant social policies furthered by the
ADEA and the policy of enforcing
agreements to arbitrate age discrim-
ination claims.
The Court held that arbitration
would not undermine the EEOC’s
role in ADEA enforcement. It noted
that an ADEA claimant is free to file
an EEOC charge even if he is pre-
cluded from instituting suit; the
EEOC has independent authority to
investigate age discrimination; the
ADEA does not indicate that
Congress intended that the EEOC
be involved in all disputes; and an
administrative agency’s mere
involvement in a statute’s enforce-
ment is insufficient to preclude arbi-
tration. Moreover, the Court said
compulsory arbitration does not
improperly deprive claimants of the
judicial forum provided by the
ADEA.
In Southland, the Supreme Court
held that, in enacting § 2 of the
FAA, Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and with-
drew the power of a state to require
a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims that the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration. The
Supreme Court declared that the
FAA, resting on Congress’s authority
under the Commerce Clause, cre-
ates a body of federal substantive
law that is applicable in both state
and federal courts. If Congress, in
enacting FAA, had intended to cre-
ate a procedural rule applicable 
only in federal courts, the Supreme
Court said it would not have limited
the act to contracts “involving 
commerce.”
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court now has the
opportunity to clarify whether in
light of these cases the FAA pre-
empts a state law mandating that a
matter be submitted to an adminis-
trative agency before a complainant
who has agreed to arbitration may
seek judicial resolution or have the
matter submitted to arbitration.
This is an important case with
respect to defining the nature of dis-
putes that can be submitted to arbi-
tration. A decision in favor of the
petitioner will demonstrate the
Supreme Court’s continued policy of
encouraging arbitration of all dis-
putes. It would limit the ability of
states to require that disputes be
submitted to state administrative
agencies for resolution.
A decision in favor of the respon-
dent would limit the applicability of
the FAA to state courts. It would
permit states, in some situations, to
require that certain matters be sub-
mitted to state administrative agen-
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cies before they can be submitted to
the courts or to arbitration.
Moreover, the respondent has also
invited the Supreme Court to con-
sider overruling its decision in
Southland, holding that the FAA is a
substantive statute.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Petitioner Arnold M. Preston
(Joseph D. Schleimer, Schleimer &
Freundlich, LLP (310) 273-9807)
For Respondent Alex E. Ferrer (G.
Eric Brunstad, Jr., Bingham
McCutchen LLP (860) 240-2700)
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioner Arnold M.
Preston 
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America (Andrew J.
Pincus (202) 263-3000)
CTIA—the Wireless Association
(Glen D. Nager (202) 879-3939)
Macy’s Group Inc. (Glen D. Nager
(202) 879-3939)
Pacific Legal Foundation
(Timothy Sandefur (916) 419-7111)
In Support of Respondent Alex E.
Ferrer
Screen Actors Guild, Inc., et al.
(Duncan Crabtree-Ireland (323)
549-6043)
William Morris Agency (David J.
Bederman (404) 727-6822)
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